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1. Background
On 29 January 1986 the member states of the then Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the five Nordic countries signed a Joint
Declaration on expanded economIc and cultural cooperation, referred to as the
Nordic/SADCC Initiative (NSI). i A concomitant Framework for a Programme of
Cooperation 1986-90 was agreed to with a view to deepening and broadening the
relations between the two regions.. Towards the completion of the first phase of
cooperation a Nordie review was undertaken in 1990 to assess experiences gained
in the initial phase. An agreement for a sec ond phase was signed by the paries in
Januar 1991 to cover the period through 1995. At this juncture the Nordic
countries and their counterpars in Southern Africa are considering the future of
their relations anew.
The Joint Meeting of Nordic/SADC Ministers held in Lilongwe in Februar 1995
addressed the issue of the future of the Nordic/SADC Initiative. In his statement
on behalf of the Nordie countries, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Government of Norway, Asbjørn Mathiesen, pointed out that the economIc and
political environment in the SADC region had changed considerably since the
launching of the Initiative in 1986, and that the policies of the Nordic region were
undergoing changes.
Re recalled that the Initiative had strong political overtones: the desire on both
sides to stand firm against aparheid. Re argued that this was no longer areason
to maintain the Initiative along old lines. Furthermore, he urged that a number of
obstacles to trade and investment meant to be overcome by the Initiative had in
recent years been removed.
It was underscored that the Nordie countries were reexamining their policies
towards the developing world in the light of experiences garnered from three
decades of development cooperation, while at the same time taking cognizance of
major political changes at the globalleveL. It was also noted that Finland and
Sweden had recently become members of the European Union, whereas Iceland
and Norway had remained non-members. Notwithstanding these changes,
Mathiesen assured the meeting that Nordic/SADC cooperation would continue.
For the sake of simplicity the acronym SADC, as opposed to SADCC, wil be used throughout
the report.
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In response, the SADC Ministers, while recognising the changes that have
occurred, reaffirmed the need to maintain Nordic/SADC cooperation, albeit in a
restructured form.
The Ministers approved the establishment of a Joint Working Group of Senior
Officials to review and elaborate further the future cooperation framework between
the two regions, takng into account recent political and economic changes.
This review has been commssioned by the Joint Working Group referred to
above, with a view to providing a basis for decision-makng about the future
relations between the two regions (see terms of reference in Appendix 1). Rence,
the review is looking to the future rather than dwellng on past pedormance. Even
so, by way of introduction a retrospective account is provided in order to
substantiate the claim that tangible output leaves much to be desired. Specific
recommendations for the future are advanced in the concluding chapter.
The methodology and time constraints imposed on the consultants have precluded
a thorough and comprehensive review of all substantive elements of the Initiative.
Rather, emphasis has been put on policy issues relevant to future collaboration.
They are based on previous reviews and recent discussions with a broad cross-
section of interviewees in six SADC member states, as well as written documents
and some submissions by countries not visited. A preliminar oral presentation
was made be fore the J oint W orking Group at its meeting in Gaborone on 28
September 1995, from which the consultants received valuable feedback. A
questionnaire was elaborated and distributed in August 1995 with a view to
soliciting assessments of past pedormance of the NSI and ideas with respect to its
future scope and orientation. It should be pointed out, however, that the response
rate has been disappointing. This report must be read with that caveat in mind.
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2. Performanee to Date
2.1 The Original Concept
The genesis of the Initiative must be understood in the context of the inter-
national situation which arose in the early 1980's after the North-South
negotiations over the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) had
reached an impasse due to the intransigenee of major Western powers of the
OECD on critical issues raised by the Group of 77. The international community
had by then been involved in a protracted negotiation proeess know n as the North-
South dialogue. The challenge was to reform existing relationships between rich
countries of the North and poor ones of the South.
In the Nordic countries there was at the time considerable frustration in political
and bureaucratie circles about the meagre results of the NIEO negotiations.
Already in the late 1970's the idea had been mooted to make an attempt to
implement some of the principles of the NIEO on a limited scale between a group
of industrialised countries and a corresponding grouping of developing countries.
As a selective implementation of global NIEO principles on an inter-regional basis
the concept was thus dubbed a , Mini-NIEO' . At a meeting of the Nordie Council
Presidium in Oslo on 30 November 1982 the then Prime Minister of Finland,
Kalevi Sorsa, proposed to investigate the possibilities of establishing a special
economic arangement between the Nordie countries and a group of developing
countries, albeit not specifying any particular group. Re alluded to the Lomé
Convention as a possible model to be emulated. The 'Mini-NIEO' and the 'Sorsa
Initiative' were almost identical in substance, the only significant differenee being
that the former would probably extendbeyond the Nordie group of countries if
implemented. Rence the envisaged cooperation aimed at changing traditional
international patterns of produetion and trade as well as other forms of interaction.
The NIEO reference in the Nordic/SADC Initiative should be seen, therefore,
primarilyas an indication of wilingness to introduce more equitable forms of
economic interaction between the Nordie and SADC regions within the North-
South context. It was not then and is stil not considered to be undermining
multilateralism in international relations. On the contrar, the diffusion of
multilateral intercourse has generated a demand for selective regional as well as
bilateral arrangements. As such, the Nordic/SADC Initiative, like any Mini-NIEO
scheme, was not seen as a substitute for, or an alternative to, a fully-fledged NIEO
on a global scale.
The response by SADC was positive and saw the Initiative as:
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... a political affirmation of solidarity... (and) ... a new model for North/South cooperative
relations, mo ving away from a one-dimensional donor/recipient relationship to one covering
the broad spectrum of the economIes of the two parner groups and characterised by an open
dialogue based on inter-dependence and mutuality of interest;
The innovative aspect of the Initiative, compared to conventional bilateral aid
relations, was its regional character and its emphasis on expanded cooperation.
Such collaboration was meant to include measures to promote productive activities
and trade through financial mechanisms, as well as culturalexchange. It aimed at
improving the coordination of Nordie support for SADC, as well as strengthening
regional cooperation among SADC member states. At the time of the signing of
the two documents expectations were raised to unrealistic levels which later
proved diffcult to fulfiL.
The Initiative comprised three main substantive components:
(a) support for the productive sectors and trade;
(b) cultural cooperation; and
(c) development assistance.
Overall, the Initiative cannot after ten years by any stretch of the imagination be
termed a success in terms of tangible output such as trade volume, joint
investment ventures, and cultural exchanges. The results are all the more
disconeerting in terms of cost effectiveness, however measured.
Since its inception most energies of the Initiative have gone into creating
conditions and mechanisms conducive to expansion of intra-regional and extra-
regional trade and to promotion of joint ventures in productive activities.
Achievements and setbacks are enumerated below.
2.2 Trade
It must be acknowledged that the results from efforts to promote trade between the
two regions have been meagre and disappointing. With the exception of minerals
and to a lesser extent agro-industrial and agricultural produce, the SADC region
has little to offer consumers in the Nordic countries. This picture emerges from
surveys conducted by Nordie import promotion agencies of the product range, and
the situation has not changed appreciably over the past decade. To be true, there
are a few isolated 'success stories'. In volume terms, however, they have had only
marginal impact on trade statistics. Exports from the Nordie countries to SADC
have until recently been hampered by foreign exchange constraints. Despite the
removal of such constraints a lack of tradition in trading with the Nordics as
contrasted to lon g established trade links with former colonial powers stil persists.
Many Nordie exports have been aid-driven or stimulated by various support
schemes. It is questionable whether such exports would have been sustainable
without aid-related support.
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The prospects for increased Nordic/SADC trade in the near future are not good.
The only possible exception is South Africa. At present South Africa has a
tremendous comparative advantage in its trading infrastrueture in relation to the
other Southern African countries. Nordie traders are keenly exhibiting a renewed
interest in trade with South Africa, which might have spilover effects on the
region as a whole.
The counterpars in the SADC region of the Nordie trade promotion ageneies are
overwhelmingly public export promotion organs, and' in a few cases chambers of
commerce. It has been diffcult to establish and maintain contact between them.
Once communication has been established it has been an uphil struggle to
generate interest on a sustainable basis.
Under the Initiative ajoint Nordic/SADC trade advisory group (NSTAG) has been
in operation since 1989 in order to serve as a source of analysis, counsel and
inspiration for public authorities, organisations and market actors in the respective
countries of the two regions, both in terms of trade policy work and trade
promotion. Over the years the group has produced a number of studies and
working papers intended for market actors and public bodies involved in trade
promotion.
As an advisory group it is clearly not its function to pursue, follow up or
implement the ideas and policy proposals it advances. Effective utilsation of the
advice offered presupposes a distribution and implementation machinery. The wil
and capacity for follow-up and implementation seem to be largely lacking in both
regions, but paricularly in SADC. Within the institutional structure of SADC the
administrative unit charged with trade issues is the SADC Industry and Trade
Coordination Division (SITCD) based in Dar es Salaam, which has not adequately
fulfiled its function with respect to distribution of the reports emanating from the
trade advisory group, nor has it proved capable of following up proposals by other
means or in other ways.
The logical actors to pursue and implement proposals in the trade sphere would
have been the business councils at member state level or at the regionalleveL.
However, this also leaves much to be desired, partly because the effective
functioning of the business councils at member state leve1 is highly variable, and
partly because the SADC business council at the regionalievel never really took
off. The latter was, in fact, disbanded in 1993. The upshot of this is the deplorable
fact that the ideas and policy proposals of the trade advisory group hardly reached
beyond the report stage. There is hope, however, that the newly established
Eastern and Southern African Business Organisation (ESABO) may prove an
expedient vehicle in trade promotion.
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2.3 Investment
Many of the efforts under the Initiative have been made at the behest of
institutions in the public sector and with public actors in mind, especially in the
initial stages. It has been claimed that the private sector was not allowed onto the
scene as envisaged. To some extent this may have created an impression on the
par of the business communities in the two regions, paricularly in the Nordic
countries, that the commercial elements of the NSI (trade and investment) were
never really taken seriously. Whether such a perception is correct or not is beside
the point. The reality of such perceptions may have acted as a deterrent on top of
other disincentives.
At the outset it should be acknowledged that Southern Africa has not figured
prominently in the minds of potential Nordic investors. If anything, the feeble
interest in Africa encountered previously has waned during the 1980' s due to the
severe economic crisis in the region, bureaucratic inertia and red tape,
comparatively poor infrastructure, foreign exchange constraints, shortage of skilled
labour and middle management cadres and a host of other impediments. Hence,
other regions of the world have been and are more interesting as investment
outlets, particularly Asia at the present time. Given this situation it was not to be
expected that investments would occur spontaneously without exogenous stimuli.
Against this backdrop expectations with respect to business cooperation between
companies in the two regions were no doubt unduly exaggerated. With the benefit
of hindsight it should have been recognised that the opportunities were limited.
Policy shifts towards economic liberalisation are now contributing towards
changing that. SADC has since the early 1990' s definitely been playing a
reinforced supportive role in that direction.
Even so, new competitors for investment capital have emerged. The recent
developments in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have
opened up possibilties for private enterprise, and the anticipated flow of funds
eastwards from the West poses new and interesting challenges to Nordie
companies. Eastern European markets are close to the Nordic borders. Previous
trade barriers and other hindrances to economic cooperation appear to be quickly
disappearing. The cultures and politics of Eastern Europe are after all more similar
in nature to those of the Nordie countries than are those of Southern Africa.
The above picture must be qualified, though. A number of persons who have had
technical assistance assignments in Africa, and who have developed an affinity for
the continent and its peoples, have been active in investment promotion. They may
either be entrepreneurs in their own right attempting to set up enterprises
themselves or in partnership with local counterparts. Or they may have links with
companies otherwise unlikely to east their eyes on Southern Africa, which they
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have been prodding into investment ventures. Perseveranee has brought them
success in some cases.
The single most important activity under the Initiative for promotion of joint
ventures between Nordie and SADC companies was the establishment in 1989 of
the NORSAD Fund and Agency, designed to ease or overcome foreign exchange
constraints. The initial years of operation were turbulent and difficult, produeing
very little impact. But lately operations appear to be yielding results. A number
of joint ventures are bein g supported and more are in the pipeline (see section
6.2.1 below for details).
Following the recent democratisation of South Africa a renewed interest in
investment is discernable. But potential investors are stil cautious due to political
uncertainty and labour market unrest; they are not reassured that policy reversal
can be ruled out. Initially trade with South Africa is seen to be less risky, but
provided stabilty and predictabilty of the policy environment ensue investments
may follow suit at a later stage.
In view of the perceived uncertainty about the situation in South Africa, it might
be relevant for potential investors to consider locating production plants in
neighbouring countries, e.g. Botswana, Namibia or Zimbabwe, where political
stability may be ensured, labour costs are lower and the general investment climate
on par with that of South Africa. In the cases of Botswana and Namibia, being
members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), marketing to South
Africa would not be hampered by customs tariffs. Despite the merits of the above
arguments, the impression so far is that, in the caIculations of potential investors,
it would take much more to outweigh the comparative advantage of South Africa
in infrastructure and proximity to the South African market. The only exception
might be where raw materials of production or sources of energy are physically
located in neighbouring countries (mining and tourism are cases in point). It
appears that the South African outlet is stil far more attractive. Ceteris paribus,
political risk may be critical, otherwise not. In a longer term perspective the
location of production plants in South Africa could stil be used as a bridgehead
for expansion northwards to the region at large. This is the more likely scenario.
2.4 Cultural Collaboration
Culture was originally envisaged as one of the pilars of the Initiative. Yet, most
Nordic and SADC offcials have paid little more than lip service to it. To be true,
some exchanges of theatre, dance and musical groups have taken place, as have
visits of football and other sporting teams, mostly on a bilateral basis, though. The
funds set aside for cultural activities have been rather limited, and the approach
to this field of activity has been ad hoc and somewhat haphazard, intermittent and
without a clear sense of direction.
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At the Nordic end governments have tended to finance cultural activities from
different sources in no consistent manner, typically from bilateral budget lines,
depending on the nature of the paricular project in question. In many cases it is
difficult to determine the regional relevance of cultural efforts, and activities could
often have been handled better on a bilateral basis. The fact that the secretariat of
the Nordic Council of Ministers for a while served as a focal point for cultural
matters meant little more than a ' mailbox' function and no coordination proper.
The envisaged fund for cultural cooperation, though financially modest, never
materialised. Today, there is arguably hardly any need for the NSI umbrella unless
activities are given a regional dimension.
Within SADC culture was until recently not considered a ' sector' proper with the
consequence that no coordinating unit existed for cultural activities. As aresult,
it has been entirely up to each individual member state to take whatever action it
wished. A SCU for information and culture does exist today, but it is starved of
resources and has not managed to assert its coordinating role. Overall, it is
probably no exaggeration to say that cultural cooperation has, in effect, although
perhaps not deliberately, been treated as a residual category of activity under the
Initiative. The signing in 1989 at the Luanda Annual Consultative Conference of
a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a programme of action for cultural
cooperation did not make much difference as its provisions were vague and
general.
Senior offcials and politicians have stated emphatically that cultural cooperation
is important in bringing the Initiative out to the people in order to broaden the
understanding of the concept. The Initiative has been toa much the province of top
politicians and officials. It needs to be democratised and grow popular roots. The
peoples of Southern Africa and the Nordie region need to know more about the
activities under the Initiative in order to understand its rationale and to appreciate
its meaning to their daily lives. Whereas the realism of such notions may be
questioned, the long-term visions towards such a future are certainly present.
2.5 Development Åssistance
Since the Initiative was first and foremost intended to expand inter-regional
collaboration beyond the aid relationship, the programmes of development
assistance wil not be dwelt upon here. Suffce it to say that each of the Nordic
countries have continued their support for the SADC Programme of Action at a
consistently high leve1 since well before the Initiative was launched.
The launching of the Initiative appears to have had a positive effect on Nordie
coordination of aid activities in the Southern African region. The frequency and
intensity of liaison between Nordic aid agencies increased, preventing duplication
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of effort and leading to a more rational division of labour and greater
effectiveness. This has probably applied to the planning, financing and
implementation phases alike.
The question of whether the Initiative has led to additional resources being
furnished is indeed difficult to answer with accuracy. It is not possible to ascertain
ex post facto whether history would have taken a different path had events and
developments previously been different from what they actually were. In fact it is
a counterfactual question which cannot be answered scientifically. However,one
may merely reason around the issue and make inferences with some credibility
about a probable causal relationship.
It is the considered view of the consultants that as far as the volume of
development assistance is concerned the Initiative has to date hardly led to
additionality. Rather, it has tended to dissipate resources to more areas of activity
which have been added to the Initiative. Virtually all activities under the Initiative
have been aid-financed. The hope for additional resources originally hinged on the
involvement of the private sector in investment and trade. Since this has not
materialised to any degree, additionality has been modest. In the 1990's the
competition for aid resources from Eastern and Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union may have led to a certain diversion of funds and a corresponding
reduction of flows towards Southem Africa. The diffculties in some Nordic
economies, especially that of Finland, have led to dramatic cuts in development
assistance. Overall, after a decade of the Initiative the claim is not justified that
aid resources have increased. Nonetheless, on balance Nordic aid to Southern
Africa - bilaterally and multilaterally - has been maintained at a comparatively
high level throughout the decade under review.
Principal weakesses encountered en raute in the implementation of aid projects
and programmes have to do with the uneven capabilities of the Sector
Coordinating Units. This problem has not been resolved and continues to thwar
progress, more so in some sectors than in others. It is not a problem specific to
the NSI but goes to the core of SADC's institutional structure.
The perennial problem in the implementation of the Programme of Action
concerns operation and maintenance. Donor support, inc1uding that from the
Nordic countries, is largely directed to installation of new c ap aci t y in infrastructure
and production, or rehabiltation of structures which have fallen into disrepair. Due
to the economic crisis or constraints of most SADC member states this problem
also remains unresolved and threatens the long-term sustainability of the projects
and programes.
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2.6 Differing Perceptions
The consultants have in the course of their work discerned differing perceptions
of the nature and scope of the Initiative between regions and within regions. In the
Nordic countries politicians and offcials at various levels perceive differently of
the Initiative. This is not only reflected in their thinking but also in the
bureaucratic set-up and procedures applied.
In Norway and Sweden where the aid agencies charged with implementation of
projects and programmes are distinct management units, separate budget headings
have existed for basically three components: (a) bilateral support for individual
SADC member states (specified by countr); (b) support for SADC's Prograre
of Action; and (c) support for the Nordic/SADC Initiative. Headings (a) and (b)
have normally fallen under the auspices of the aid agencies, e.g. NORAD and
SIDA, whereas the latter has generally been managed by the Ministries of
Development Cooperation or Foreign Affairs. Given the legacy of the genesis of
the Initiative bein g driven by politicians and senior civil servants of the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs this structure has caused operational frictions in implementation.
In Denmark and Finland where the implementing aid agencies are deparments of
the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, frictions appear to have been fewer
and the budget structure more flexible.
In the SADC region the conception of the Nordic countries as one entity has been
commonplace. While it is true that there is a large measure of commonality among
these countries in terms of history, language, culture, and economic and political
forms, it should be fully recognised by SADC that they are five distinet states with
separate identities and idiosyncracies. Likewise, while it is true that a large
number of Nordie inter-governmental and public bodies and NGOs do exist on a
regionwide basis, and that there has been virtual free movement of capital and
labour across borders as an expression of a relatively high leve1 of integration, the
notion that these countries form one unified and homogeneous bloc and are
capable of acting as such, is erroneous. The Nordic Council is a mere forum for
exchange of opinions among parliamentarians with no decision-makng authority.
The Nordic Council of Ministers is a forum of consultation without supra-national
powers of decision-makng.
The Nordic countries, paricularly as represented at the diplomatic level by their
respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, may have given some credence, by design
or unwittingly, to the notion by Southern Africans that the Nordic region is more
homogeneous and coordinated than it really is. The heterogeneity of the Nordie
region has been further accentuated by the entrance of Finland and Sweden into
the European Union.
There are differing perceptions of time involved as well. At the Nordic end the
tendency is to see the Initiative in renewable time periods of five years each with
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an implicit understanding that it may come to an end if the paries so decide. At
the SADC end the emphasis is much more on the continuous nature of a region-to-
region relationship with no implicit notion of a fixed time horizon. The five-year
periods are seen merelyas convenient planning and implementation phases of a
very long-term relationship. Springing from these differing time perceptions are
certain apprehensions, anxieties and expectations which have implications for the
management and progress of the Initiative.
2.7 Administrative Mechanisms
The question of mechanisms of cooperation and consultation has generated much
controversy and friction over the years. There is no doubt that procedural matters
have received disproportionate attention relative to substantive issues. Both parties
agree that the mechanisms have been less than satisfactory - both in terms of
efficient decision-makng and cost-effectiveness. Yet a solution has proved elusive.
In pursuance of a recommendation made by the 1990 Nordic review of the NSI
Jan Cedergren of SIDA was asked to make an in-depth review of these
mechanisms. He submitted his report in November 1991 and made a number of
suggestions for improvement. His report was discussed at the Joint Meeting of
Senior Officials in Maputo in conjunction with the 1992 Annual Consultative
Conference. After a heated debate no consensus was reached. The continuing
wrangles over these matters have been frustrating and very taxing on the goodwil
of the civil servants involved.
The main problem has been the Senior Officials Meeting which is simply toa large
and cumbersome. To hold three such meetings per year is wasteful. It is
mandatory that the number of meetings be reduced, preferably to one, and
attendance scaled down. Dispensing with this organ altogether is indeed an option.
Not least it is important to improve preparation.
In late 1992 some sort of compromise was reached between the new Nordic
coordinator and the chairmen of the SADC Council of Ministers and Standing
Commttee of Offciais: a meeting of Nordic/SADC coordinators was institute d on
an informal basis, principally to ensure preparation of agenda and documents for
the Joint Senior Offcials Meetings. In addition to the Nordic coordinator one
designated person (in practice two or three have met) from the SADC Secretariat
would meet, plus members of the joint advisory groups or others as required on
an ad hoc basis. Ideally the coordinators of either side should have been delegated
decision-makng authority on specified matters, but this has been diffcult to
achieve given the nature of SADC as an organisation and the looseness of the
Nordic side. A fresh look should be taken to rationalise and streamline procedures,
no matter what form future cooperation may take.
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3. Recent Developments in Southern Africa
3.1 General Developments
The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was
adopted in August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. The Treaty represents the
culmination of processes that have been underway in the region for some time.
One of the central founding objectives of SADC's predecessor, the Southern
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) established in 1980,
was "the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration" .
Initially, and in the context of major deficiencies in the region's transport and
communications infrastructure, the region agreed that the first priority should be
accorded to cooperating in infrastructural projects. The emphasis later shifted from
specific projects towards the coordination of sectoral plans and programmes, and
also from the development of infrastructure to measures intended for the
promotion of investment and production. All of this was seen not only as a step
towards reducing dependence, but also as laying the foundation for genuine and
equitable integration.
The 1992 Theme Document SADCC: Towards Economic Integration argued that
the region had reached a point where steps towards regional integration were
warranted. A higher leve! of cooperation would enable the countries of the region
to address problems of natural development, and to cope more effectively with the
challenges posed by a changing, and increasingly complex, regional and global
environment. Increased regional trade and cross border investment in themselves
could yield significant benefits. More importantly, the restructuring of productive
sectors, as a basis for self-sustaining development and growth, and to resp ond
effectively to changes in the world economy, would be more feasible on a regional
than a national basis. Moreover, the countries of the region need to overcome
collectively the shar disparities in the pedormance of the various economies, as
the only viable basis for fulfillng, in the long term, the principles of balance,
equity and mutual benefit, which form the foundation for regional integration in
Southern Africa.
Within SADC there have been two major development in the 1990' s. The first is
that SADC as a regional organisation is in the process of trans forming itself from
a fairly unstructured, one might even say informal, regional grouping of countries
with common interests and purposes into a formal regional community with
protocols and treaties. The SADC Treaty is a legally binding and all-encompassing
framework by which countries in the region shall move towards integration.
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Secondly, most of the SADC countries are in the throes of structural adjustment
programmes. Considerable advances from an investment and trade liberalisation
perspective have been made in countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
from regimes which were highly centralised and controlled to open market
economies with few price and foreign exchange controls in paricular. Similar
pro gress is being made in Malawi. Mozambique has liberalised but deep
adjustment wil only take place once capital resources are released for production.
Angola is emerging from the agony of a civil war and while pars of the country
such as Luanda operate a type of formal economy much infrastrueture and trade
is not functioning.
The southernmost grouping of countries, which belong to the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU), Le. Botswana, Lesotho, Nambia and Swaziland, have
maintained fairly unrestricted trade and investment regimes even though they are
heavily influenced by the activities in the South African economy. South Africa
itself has a moderately liberal economy with few restrictions on current account
transactions. Moves are afoot to unbundle its highly oligopolistic ownership
structures in the private sector. Mauritius, the newest SADC member, has
maintained a free market economy for a number of years, and it is the most
advanced in terms of free zone activities.
Aside from the economic changes, there has been a steady shift towards political
pluralis m and democratisation in the SADC countries. The concept of
multipartyism has been strengthened both by the changes in the international
environment but also by popular movements demanding representation in the
organs of government. Nambia emerged from ilegal South African occupation as
an independent state in 1990 after a transitional period under UN supervision
culminating in general elections. Zambia held multi-party elections in 1991. The
successful transition in 1994 to majority rule in South Africa was a formidable
achievement in its own right and gave a boost to the democratisation process in
the region at large. Malawi and Mozambique held multi-party elections in 1994
and Tanzania wil be holding such elections at the end of October 1995. A
democratic dispensation is also being formulated in Angola despite setbacks and
a resumption of hostilities after the 1992 general elections which were decIared
free and fair by internationalobservers.
Any framework for cooperation between the Nordic and SADC states should be
based within the context of these changes.
3.2 Specific Developments
From a technical point of view there are two important current developments
relevant to this analysis which wil assist in placing any future cooperation on the
same playing field. The developments refer to the draftng of protocols by SADC
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as the specific binding agreements, and the signing of the Berlin Dec1aration with
the European Union in September 1994.
3.2.1 Preparation of Protocols
The following protocols are being prepared to provide the legal framework for the
integration of the industry and trade sector:
Protocol on Trade Cooperation
The main thrst of this protocol is to facilitate, increase and promote intra-SADC
trade through the elimination of tarffs and non-tariffs barriers; and also to allow
competition and free and fair trade amongst SADC countries.
The elements of this protocol inc1ude:
- simplification of trade procedures to faciltate and promote trade among SADC
member states;
promotion of intra-SADC trade through various schemes;
promotion of industrial development;
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers;
encouraging cooperation in trade and customs adrnnistration;
formulation of SADC rules of origin for goods and products produced in the
SADC region;
formulation of annexes relating to customs cooperation, trade facilitation, transit
and transit facilties and trade promotion; and
gradual application of common external tariff and common external trade
policy.
Protocol on Finanee and Investment
The main thrst of this protocol is to facilitate:
- development of financial and capital markets;
- cross-border investments; and
- coordination of economic policies.
Initial work on the preparation of this protocol was undertaken by the SITCD
However, further work in the development of this protocol wil be continued by
the new SCU for finance and investment.
Mention should also be made of the Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems and
the Inter-Governmental Memorandum of Understanding in Respect of the
Formation of a Southern African Power Pool, both of which impinge on the
development of productive capacities in the region.
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3.2.2 Berlin Declaration
Some of the key operational elements of the Declaration are as follows:
Areas of Cooperation
(a) Political Dialogue
To consist of a re gular exchange of views on general matters of foreign
policy, paricularly with a view to promote peace and long- term stabilty in
the Southern African region.
(b) Regional Integration
The European Union offers to share experience in the field of regional
integration and in this respect to assist SADC through, inter alia, exchange
of personnei, training, assistance and advice on organisational matters.
(c) Trade and Economic Cooperation
The two regions undertake to prornote trade cooperation with each other, and
within the Southern African region in order to foster its economic
development, in full respect of the results of the Uruguay Round of GATT,
and without prejudice to the Lomé Convention.
(d) Private Investment, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Promotion of
the Private Sector.
(e) Development Cooperation
The Parties decIare their intention to cIosely coordinate the planning and
implementation of regional development prograres and projects in the
fields such as transport and communications, energy, trade promotion,
livestock protection, poverty alleviation, population and social development,
food security, education, training and health.
In this context, they note that under the terms of aricles 157 and 164 of the
Fourth Lome Convention, it is possible to include a neighbouring non-ACP
countr in regional cooperation projects.
The Parties reiterate the importance of the coordinating role of the European
Commssion and the SADC Secretariat in this respect.
The paricular areas for development cooperation include:
- Transport and Communication
- Energy
- Education and Training
- Health
- Food and Agriculture
- Mining
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(f) Natural Resources and the Environment
(g) Science and Technology
(h) Tourism
(i) Cultural Cooperation
(j) Cooperation in the Combating of International Crime.
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4. Recent Developments in the Nordie Region
Some of the observed changes in the Nordic countries reflect global developments
which have impacted on the smaller countries of the Nordic region. Others are
countr-specific or region-specific.
Comparable to trends in Southern Africa the Nordic region has also experienced
economic liberalisation and restructuring of their economies, albeit not by far as
dramatically and painfully. The welfare states which have been the hallmark of the
'Nordic mode!' have been pruned and are being pruned. Markets are being
liberalised and parastatals are being privatised. The discourse and atmosphere of
political life is different today from what it was only five years ago.
The collapse of the Soviet system has further dampened ideological differences.
Political c1eavages and realignments have changed. Not least have the events of
1989 in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union caused attention
and energies increasingly to be directed eastwards to the detriment of Southern
Africa. This applies to the political establishment, the business community and the
general public at large. Serious conflcts which have erupted in the wake of the
demise of a long established state system have called for humanitarian, political
and militar intervention. The best know n case in point is former Yugoslavia, but
there are many others not quite as dramatic. The transformation of previously
centrally planned economies to liberalised capitalist systems has attracted the
interest of the business community which sees opportunities for trade and
investment c10ser to home than Southern Africa.
Even though the point should not be overstated, recent years have seen an
increasing heterogeneity in the Nordie region. This is reflected in domestie policies
as well as in foreign policy orientation and affili ation.
Some economies have fared less well than others, notably those of Finland and
Sweden, with high unemployment rates, huge. budget deficits and heavy debt
burdens. This has not surprisingly led to severe budget constraints, and in some
cases drastic cuts, not sparing aid allocations. In an atmosphere of scrutiny of the
public sector, which continues to be large in all Nordic countries, attention has
been drawn to development cooperation. Politicians and civil servants are being
asked hard questions by the mass media and the electorate about the effectiveness
of aid. Much adverse media coverage recently about inefficiency, corrption, poor
follow-up etc. has made it increasingly difficult to defend the size of aid budgets
in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. Preoccupation with efficiency has
19
spurred a debate on the qualitative side of aid and a reexamnation of aid policies.
Politicians and civil servants are impatient to be able to account to the taxpayers
for the money spent and to justify the expenditure in terms of tangible output and
demonstrable beneficial effect in recipient countries. The upshot may be termed
, aid fatigue'.
Arguably the most significant change on the foreign policy scene is the entry into
the European Union by two more members of the Nordic bloc: Finland and
Sweden. Denmark became a member in 1972. Iceland has never even applied for
membership, whereas Norway did apply and negotiated the terms of entrance. But
in a referendum the Norwegian electorate said no to membership as it did in 1972.
Corresponding referenda held in Finland and Sweden yielded a yes vote.
The ramfications of this differential Nordic relationship to the major European
economic and political entity are likely to have profound effect on notions of
Nordie identity and Nordic collaboration in the long run. Already these effects are
being felt - up to a point. Finland and Sweden along with the earlier entrant,
Denmark, are now cIearly more orientated toward the EU than the Nordic region,
even though affliation to both is not mutually exclusive. Finland and Sweden as
newcorners to the community of EU members are likely to devote the bulk of their
c ap ac it y and energy to that relationship at the expense of the Nordie one. Norway
and Iceland, on the other hand, take akeener interest in the continuation of Nordic
collaboration.
The import of this in the context of the NSI is that Finland and Sweden (and
Denmark) are currently less interested. As an EU veteran Denmark has, for
instance, argued strongly that maintaining a two-track relationship to Southern
Africa through the NSI and the Berlin DecIaration is untenable, for c ap ac it y
reasons if nothing else. Harder prioritisation is necessar. By contrast Norway and
Iceland see Nordic/SADC collaboration as a vehicIe for preserving some sort of
Nordic commonality despite differing relationships to the EU.
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5. Summary of SADC Views
The views on the past and future of the NSI listed below stem partly from
responses to the questionnaire but mainly from interviewswith a considerable
number of offcials in selected SADC countries. They should not be interpreted
as necessarily reflecting an official SADC position. Rather, a considerable number
of responses are views expressed by officials in their individual capacities but
cannot be attributed to identified individuals.
The views cover a wide range at varing levels of specificity. They are not
necessarily consistent because they have not been consolidated into a common
position. The feasibility of proposals for the future has not been appraised.
5.1 General
The Nordic/SADC Initiative was established for the primar purpose of prortoting
and expanding cooperation between the Nordic/SADC regions and contributing to
economic development by extending a foreign exchange facility to joint ventures
between Nordic and SADC companies, with the objective of contributing to the
economic development and self-reliance of the paricipating SADC countries. In
addition to collaboration in the economic sphere and development cooperation, the
Initiative also comprised cultural collaboration. It was expected that this kind of
arrangement would provide yet another model of South-North cooperation.
The management of the Initiative appears to have suffered from lack of
commtment on the part of some of the paricipants. The paricipation in meetings
such as the Board of Governors of the NORSAD Fund left much to be desired in
terms of the quality of representation, judged on the basis of continuity of
attendanee and constructive contributions. Quite often the necessar quorum was
not achieved for meetings.
The role of the Nordic/SADC Initiative in terms of development cooperation is to
involve the enterprise sector in the joint development ventures between the two
regions. This would include ventures in both trade and .investment.
There wil always be interaction between the Nordic and SADC countries. The
purpose of the NSI was to create a separate support mechanism for regional
development. Despite the stated intention of a two-way interaction, this has never
materialised as it was not cIear what the SADC countries had to 'offer' the Nordic
states.
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The achievements of the Initiative so far have been very minimal and hence hardly
significant except for a few SADC ventures which have benefitted from the
NORSAD Fund and Agency.
As the only existing mechanism for consultation, the Joint Meetings of Senior
Offcials, have been satisfactory but not ideal; consultations etc. prior to Joint
Meetings of Senior Offcials have not been adequate because of delays in
sending/receiving meeting working papers.
Some attribute the meagre results to the Initiative's lack of cIarity of objectives
and their operationalisation, indeed its entire mode of operation. In the future
greater cIarity should be ensured as well as better administrative arrangements. For
instance, a small commttee should be established to prepare the agenda and
documentation for decision-makng purposes.
With reference to the historical legacy of Nordic/SADC relations dating back to
the anti-colonial liberation struggle it was apervasive view that the relations
between the two regions ought to be strengthened.
The Initiative was seen as a regional window of international relations
complementar to bilateral relations.
Although it was conceded that there may be overlap between the NSI and the
Berlin DecIaration, it was not felt that they were mutually excIusive. They should
be placed on a equal footing in terms of priori ty. It makes sense for SADC
member states to take par in multiple arrangements of this sort, e.g. the UN,
OAU, Global Coalition for Africa etc. In some circIes there were no fears that the
NSI would be overshadowed by the Berlin DecIaration because SADC would
accord higher priority to a larger, politically and economically more important
grouping. Capacity to handle dual-track relationships of a similar nature was not
seen as a major problem. It might be possible to arive at some sort of division of
labour between the two arrangements. Their respective comparative advantages
and niches should be sorted out. Others took a different view, expressing
apprehensions that the NSI could be marginalised.
Relating to the European Union was seen as more cumbersome in terms of
mechanisms and modalities, with a political undertone stemmng from the fact that
not all EU members are equally sympathetic to SADC and some have their own
political agendas.
5.2 Business Perspectives
The role of the Nordic/SADC Initiative in terms of development cooperation,
takng into consideration the above overall objective, is intended to assist SADC
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member states in sustaining their economies and accelerating economic growth
through mobilsation of their own resources and by creating an enabling
environment for private sec tor development.
The Nordic/SADC Trade Advisory Group (NS T AG) identified the shortage of
trained manpower in export marketing as one of the main obstacles to increasing
exports from the SADC region and therefore conducted a study on the above. The
study is ready and proposals have been sent to relevant institutions for
implementation. It is envisaged that this wil help SADC member states increase
their exports and thus improve their economies.
However, the meetings of the Nordic/SADC Trade Advisory Group (NSTAG)
have encountered a number of probierns. The group was facing financial problems
and could therefore not hold successful meetings as often as deemed necessar.
Other problems inc1uded lack of seriousness on the SADC side. The vacant SADC
membership positions in the group have not been filled to date. Recommendations
made by the group are also not implemented as expected. Delay in exchanging
important documents is yet another problem. The dissolution of the SADC
Regional Business Council (SRBC) worsened the situation because SRBC was the
contact point for the group. In case the NST AG arangement is maintained, it is
recommended that the coordinating sector for Industry and Trade (SITCD) be an
observer member. This proposal could assist in follow-up action for the SADC
side.
The Initiative can help facilitate the development of the private sec tor in Southern
Africa through direct involvement of the business community in Initiative
programes. Structural rigidities that existed earlier in the SADC member states
have largely been removed and the structural adjustment programmes towards
liberalisation of the economies now provide an increasingly conducive
environment for direct involvement of the business community.
There is a perceived risk that with the entry of South Africa into SADC, any new
business approaches wil be directed at that country to the detriment of the rest of
the group. Some means of addressing this would be needed in any future
framework of cooperation.
The NSI should be transformed into a business-driven relationship, with the
governments facilitating the establishment of investment forums for the private
sector.
The NORSAD Fund was held up as a success story under the Initiative (perhaps
the only one). It was felt that there was every reason for NORSAD to continue its
operations. The view was also voiced that new tasks could be tacked onto
NORSAD as an already well functioning institution by expanding its mandate.
Perhaps that would be all that needed to be done in the business sector.
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5.3 Cultural Perspectives
The Nordic/SADC Initiative was meant to be a forum for pragmatic cooperation
and a catalyst for an effective South-South cultural cooperation on the one hand
and joint SADC exchange with the Nordic countries on the other.
The Initiative has barely laid the foundation for the creation of some form of
awareness of the potentialities for bilateral and multilateral cultural cooperation.
Joint and effective cultural cooperation projects in such areas as festivals,
exhibitions, research and training are yet to be formulated, endorsed and
implemented.
SADC wants to move in the direction of a 'cultural union' as well as an economic
one, and much work stil needs to be done in working out the strategies to achieve
this aim. The term 'cultural integration' was also coined. The late Kwame
Nkrumah was paraphrased: "Seek ye first the cultural kingdom, and all else shall
follow". Culture was stressed as an important element in nurturing a regional
consciousness and identity. It was seen as part and parcel of the community-
building project. Dissemination of information is a key need and the Nordic
countries were perceived as aresource that could help fill this gap.
Others expressed scepticism about cultural collaboration as a priority under the
Initiative. Although recognising the importance of culture, it was felt that
prioritising culture would be tantamount to putting the car be fore the horse.
Expanding productive capacity should take precedence over culture. Cultural
activities need an economic base to be meaningful and sustainable.
The issue of ethnic tolerance needs to be explored to the fulle st.
The arts and crafts must be given more room and provided with more resources
and expertise in order to:
(a) Positively influence socio-cultural, political and economic development;
(b) Facilitate better and more harmonious understanding amongst the people of
the region;
(c) Stimulate common political and economic concerns and hence the ne ed for
a common approach;
(d) Stimulate ethnic, religious and elan tolerance.
The Initiative should sponsor more exchanges of performing arists, traditional and
pop musicians, athletics and soccer teams.
Joint arts and crafts exhibitions should be considered; travellng exhibitions; joint
research projects; mobile theatres; mobile museums. Investment in exhibition
facilities ineluding the founding of 'house of culture' projects, open air theatres;
open air museums are further examples of future activities.
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Joint training of cultural animators from all SADC countries would most likely
have a multiplier effect in the region. Similarly, the training of trainers in the field
of management of cultural affairs would have ripple effects throughout the region.
Construction and/or support of a SADC school or college of arts in order to make
use of performng artists and instructors who share some common aspirations and
who, therefore, would be sympathetic to the SADC cause.
There is a great need for a freer flow of information and, therefore, the need to
intensity the screening of materials from SADC countries through the television
stations of the various countries. SADC countries must train their own
programers and stage more of their own shows on their TV s as well as play
more of their own music on both television and radio. The Nordic/SADC Initiative
could assist in the production and recording of local music and the performing ars
of an indigenous nature.
The Sector Coordinating Unit for Information and Culture has been engaged in the
implementation of projects which wil facilitate active involvement of regional
arists and people. From this year several ar festivals wil be held, as follows:
* Music Festival in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1995;
* Theatre Festival in Maputo, Mozambique, in 1996;
* Ars and Crafts Regional Expo in Windhoek, Namibia, in 1997; and
* Dance Festival in Tanzania in 1998.
All of these festivals wil engage arists, technicians and journalists from all SADC
countries. The music festival is financially supported by NORAD and the ED.
The idea of a quarerly regional publication in the cultural sphere was mooted. But
its feasibilty was doubted in light of the economic difficulties encountered by the
Southern African Economist.
Regionwide cultural associations should be encouraged and supported, inc1uding
the strengthening of national chapters. Existing cases in point are the Southern and
Eastern African Librar Association and the Federation of Women in Media in
SADC (FEMSADC). There are many others and stil scope for more.
Regional harmonisation of copyright legislation is in progress. Piracy has become
a problem of considerable proportions, especially music cassettes. Even after
completing the harmonisation exercise, an effective enforcement machinery would
be lacking. The Nordic countries have expertise in this regard and a wealth of
experience to draw from.
In the promotion of music a regional recording studio with state-of-the-art
equipment would go a long way in enhancing the quality of music output. Similar
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facilities could be established in other areas of cultural activity . Regional training
institutions would be paricularly useful. Apar from its cultural nature, a recording
studio could be a joint business venture between Nordic and SADC investors.
A SADC cultural data bank was also contemplated as a networking device. It was
envisaged as containing information on who's who in SADC culturallife; cultural
infrastructure such as location of facilties; training programmes; as well as a
calendar of major cultural events. This cultural data bank would be operated via
Internet as PC technology is increasingly common in the region. However,
inputting of information would be critical, not least maintaining it over time by
continuous updating of information.
5.4 Political Perspectives
The political dimension is rather new in Nordic/SADC relations. Only recently did
SADC adopt a new 'sector' under the rubric of Political Cooperation, Democracy,
Peace and Security. No coordinating state has been designated as yet. Therefore,
there is no basis for retrospection in this regard. The views espoused refer to the
future only.
In security matters the UN Security Council is the reference point for all Southern
African states. However, a shift of UN attention away from African affairs has
been noted in recent years, even to the point of marginalising Africa - except in
dramatic cases of crises and disasters. Hence, there is a need for sub-regional
arrangements, beyond the purview of the OAU. Such arrangements should not,
however, be seen to be absolving the UN of its responsibilty.
Political dialogue could address sub-regional and continent-wide concerns, as well
as global issues such as disarmament, UN reform and the environment. It might
be possible to evolve a common stance on certain questions in a spirit of
likemindedness, e.g. on reform of the UN system. The latter would be more
difficult to achieve under the Berlin Declaration because it would impinge on the
position of European permanent members of the UN Security CounciL.
Political dialogue between Nordic and SADC states should be conducted with
some regularity to ensure continuity. SADC's Annual Consultative Conferences
could be used as venues. But there is also need for flexibility and ad hoc action
to allow for timelyand pro-active responses to acute problems which may arise.
A certain degree of informality is preferable in exchanges of views and
experiences. In some cases confidential!ty may be required by the situation at
hand.
Others warn against institutionalising political dialogue further. It is claimed that
the mechanisms for political dialogue already exist. They are there to be used
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whenever needed. The embassies of SADC states in the Nordie countries and vice
versa could be used more imaginatively, constructively and pro-actively in political
dialogue.
A prevalent view is that political dialogue should be conducted at ministerial level,
with the assistance of senior civil servants. Some would also welcome
paricipation by representatives of civil society, depending on the subject matter
under discussion. They see such paricipation as auseful mechanism for
popularisation and democratisation of SADC beyond the restricted circles of
politicians and civil servants. Others take a cautious line in this reg ard and point
out that civil society is generally weak in Southern Africa.
The concept of 'limited sovereignty' in international relations is by now accepted,
which would make extra-regional involvement in conflct mediation and settlement
a welcome addition to regional efforts.
The concept of conflct resolution and political dialogue is new for SADC. In this
respect there is a possible overlap with the thrust of the Berlin Dec1aration and the
Nordic/SADC Initiative. Capacity-building and training could be elements of
assistance from the Nordic states, e.g. in peace-keeping diplomacy and mediation.
The most effcient and effective route would be taken by SADC when sourcing
outside assistance.
Thus Nordic assistance would ideally be demand-driven in order not to prec1ude
ownership of resolution by the paries concerned. SADC would soon have a
mechanism for handling conflct resolution and related issues, and it does not
make sense to duplicate this by having a separate mechanism with outsiders.
Instead they could participate by offering their assistanee through the SADC
mechanism (Le. the Sector Coordinator). On the other hand, in certain
circumstances Nordic involvement in mediation could add impariality; Southern
African states would be likely to sympathise with either party, or be seen to be
partiaL.
The Nordic countries would have a lot to offer in the areas of good governance,
democratisation and human rights.
There is an African culture of reconciliation and forgiveness which has manifested
itself after settlements of disputes. On the other hand, there is also a 'tradition' of
armed struggle dating back to the recent past of liberation wars and further back
in pre-colonial history. This apparent contradiction calls for reflection as to its
implications for contemporar conflct resolution.
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6. Future Constraints and Opportunities
This chapter addresses the future constraints and opportunities facing a new
framework for Nordic/SADC cooperation. As a background reference is made to
the previous chapters which have discussed passed performance - achievements
and setbacks - both in terms of substantive output and administrative mode of
operation. These should be recalled when reading this chapter and the final one.
While acknowledging the fact that achievements after ten years have not matched
expectations, care should be taken not to base decisions about the future on
experiences of the past. This applies, a fortia ri, when significant changes for the
better have occurred since the mid- 1980' s, paricularly in the Southern African
region.
The purpose of this chapter is not only to enumerate constraints and opportunities
but also to set the tone and lay the premises for the concluding chapter with
specific recommendations.
6.1 Constraints
SADC has a formal institutional structure with a functioning secretariat, while the
Nordic states do not have a comparable structure. On a number of occasions the
view was expressed by SADC officials that "there was no counterpart on the
Nordic side" to discuss proposals.
At the Nordic level much of the dialogue takes place on an 'informal' basis
between development organisations and government departments. There is
coordination of views, but there are signs that this may be fragmenting with some
states having joined the EU, and Finland reducing its development assistance role
within a Nordic framework. Even so, a measure of likemindedness is stil present,
which is important if future relationships with SADC are going to work at the
practical level.
Even though SADC has a formal institutional structure the Sector Coordinating
Units (SCU) have faced problems of capacity and funding. They have also faced
difficulties in know ing who they should be dealing with when a Nordic/SADC
activity needed coordination. Usually it ended up as a SADC to bilateral donor
dialogue. SCUs are often heavily commtted with their day to day work and face
problems in coordination of the NSI. Capacity-building and financial resources
were of ten stated as essential needs.
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It should also be noted that there are no apparent institutions that represent the
Nordie business community as opposed to the nationalieveL. This again can be
problematic in coordinating a joint Nordic private sector approach. On the SADC
side the recently formed Eastem and Southern African Business Organisation
(ESABO) which inc1udes most SADC members, and in which South Africa is
actively involved, means that there is a serious move by the business community
itself to have a regional structure. Indeed, in the transport and tourism sectors
simiiai regional business structures are already in place.
Most prograres are covered by bilateral support, while there is a project by
project approach to the NSI, and not a broader long-term prograre which would
enhance planning.
SADC countries have not seen concrete examples of additionality except in a few
specific cases such as NORSAD. The working examples of a Nordic/SADC
activity are NORSAD and the Nordic/SADC Journalism Centre. In both cases
success is bu ilt around a formal institution that has a budget and technical
resources.
There have been few concrete examples of cultural cooperation that could be
labelled SADC/Nordic. A music festival was held in Sweden, and a series of
SADC arts festivals have just begun. As with other areas, the key concern is more
to establish a SADC identity within SADC itself before looking at extending into
inter-regional relations. Strength in diversity nevertheless needs to be based on a
homogeneous vision of the future and this is what SADC is stil trying to build.
In thepolitical sphere there appears to be considerable overlap with possible
structures evolving with the European Union, under the terms of the Berlin
Dec1aration. There are also other regional cooperation initiatives under discussion.
One is with the ASEAN countries and the other is with Latin America. Some loss
of focus is a risk with all these activities takng place.
6.2 Opportunities
SADC is stil evolving and the move to binding protocols and treaties may help
in defining the type of activities which a new framework of cooperation may
support and faciltate. This is paricularly relevant in the business sector where
considerable progress has been made in preparing the SADC Trade Protocol, and
secondly in the creation of the new sector of Finance and Investment.
Potential future N ordic/SADC cooperation under a new framework could, as
indicated in the terms of reference, inc1ude the following broad areas:
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I Business
(a) An enhanced NORSAD which includes a promotional work plan for
investment, technology transfer and management expertise input;
(b) Assistance in creating a better investment environment in SADC through
Nordic technical assistance;
(c) Creation of an information interchange mechanism, paricularly for business.
and culture;
(d) Addressing the weak links between the private sector and government in the
SADC region. In particular there is the need for analytical capacity-building
within the private sector organisations.
Il Culture
(a) Continuation of support to the Journalism Centre;
(b) Cultural interchanges under a formal work programme;
(c) Support to activities aimed at creating a SADC regional identity, e.g.
regional associations and training facilities for various cultural areas.
ILL Politics
(a) Political dialogue focusing on regional issues such as conflct resolution;
(b) Assistance for traintng in peace-keeping diplomacy and mediation;
(b) Addressing global issues in a spirit of likemindedness with a view to
ariving at a common stance in international fora.
6.2.1 Business
Particular attention needs to be given to the NORSAD Fund, as it is often cited
as the key area of cooperation that has been implemented under the NSI. Much
of the following is drawn from the evaluation of NORSAD that was completed
earlier this year.
It is important to note the statements and agreements which emanated from the
1995 SADC Annual Consultative Conference, in terms of its impact on NORSAD.
Resource mobilisation was seen as a critical constraint. There was a need to hasten
regional integration and to stimulate the private sector amongst other measures. It
was agreed that the establishment of a regional development bank was not
presently advisable due to the competition for scarce resources. This conc1usion
supports the continued existence of a Development Finance Institution (DFI) such
as NORSAD which is a) bringing new capital resources to private sector
development and b) has a regional orientation.
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The 1995 SADC Theme Document SADC: Resources, Institutions and Capacity
for Integration also highlights these issues with statements such as:
Resources from outside the region wiI continue to be necessar to supplement the region's
own resources. However, it must be emphasised that foreign resources to the region can
only supplement and not replace our own efforts.
The above viewpoints implicitly support the continuation of areformed NORSAD
that can broaden the range of medium to long-term financial instruments available,
that can provide credit guarantees to projects, and that can also move the aid
paradigm along the route of mutually beneficial investment relations between the
Nordic and SADC business communities. NORSAD's current liquidity position,
its tight and co st effective administrative structure and its potential to tap into a
broader resource base through the Nordic Development Fund (NDF) is important
in restoring some faith in development finance.
Specifically reinforcing this view is the statement in the 1995 Theme Document
that:
The region wil continue to need the support of the international community for some time
to come ... This wiI require a level of transparency and predictabilty that can only be
bestowed by an agreement between SADC and its parners based on the principle of
reciprocity. Predictabilty is important for any significant investment flows to take place. In
this regard the Nordic/SADC Initiative should be reinvigorated...
The recent evaluation of the NORSAD Fund found that since the change in
statutes and appointment of new Chief Executive Offcer (CEO), it hasbeen
operating effciently and is fulfiling a proven and fast expanding demand. The
projects evidence positive developmental aspects. NORSAD is cooperating with
other Nordic DFIs in keeping with the principle of complementarity. NORSAD is
therefore an appropriate and relevant facility.
However, the evaluation also found that NORSAD management is presently
working in an atmosphere of equivocation. This must be rectified.
The decision-making structure for the NORSAD Fund and Agency is overly
cumbersome and costly given the size and nature of the Fund. This results in
duplication and conflict between the various levels and requires considerable time
and effort from all sides to administer. The structure does not give the CEO full
responsibility and accountability for the operations and results of the Agency, as
is done in the private sector.
The guiding philosophy behind NORSAD is one of enterprise development and
joint venture linkages between the Nordic and SADC states. The 'Nordic link' was
fundamental to the rationale for a fund such as NORSAD. Despite Finland and
Sweden recently joining the European Union, in addition to Denmark having been
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a member since 1972, the concept of such a link is still valid. With peace and
stabilty returning to the SADC region, South Africa joining the grouping, and
signs of Western Europe being more interested in Eastern Europe, there is a need
for a financial mechanism to facilitate Nordic/SADC business ventures.
It has been recommended that NORSAD be linked with and managed by a Nordic
DFI such as the NDF. The NORSAD financial services wil be marketed together
with the private sector services - or the business to business services - of a
financial institution, inc1uding both equity and loans. It is proposed that the parent
institution should maintain the SADC-based NORSAD office. This wil ensure
continuity and a focus on the region, as well as giving the NDF a window into the
region for its other operations.
In order to maintain a c10se link at the policy level between the SADC and Nordic
sponsors, a new Advisory Council should be established to replace the existing
Boards of Directors and Governors. The new council should comprise four
representatives from the Nordic states and four SADC representatives. The new
council would elect a chairman who would have a casting vote. It would provide
guidance and facilitation to the NORSAD operations.
The SADC markets are generally not know n to businesses in the Nordic countries
and without promotion it is not expected that many new initiatives wil emerge.
At present, no alternative seems to exist for NORSAD promotion. It is either
NORSAD promotion or no promotion of the Nordic/SADC business opportunities.
The national development finance institutions plan to use their funds for promotion
differently - promoting business opportunities in other places of the world. This
state of affairs is likely to change somewhat as South Africa is entering the market
for international investments.
Under the NSI, joint ventures and other investment were to be promoted not only
by the NORSAD Fund, but also by strengthening and rationalising development
financing mechanisms in the SADC region, by increasing awareness in the SADC
region of facilities available from Nordic DFIs and other concessionar
mechanisms offered by Nordic countries, and by increasing awareness of banks
and corporations of investment opportunities. The NSI does not specify, however,
who is responsible for implementing these various initiatives, nor how they are to
be funded. Progress has been limited, therefore, with the exception of NORSAD.
The future opportunities for NORSAD can be summarised by the following:
Clients' Needs
The clients would like to see a different NORSAD - a NORSAD that would be
able to:
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(a) assist with a total financial package, including equity and loans, and take
securities/mortgages directly;
(b) give practical assistance including financial engineering;
(c) provide an umbrella for foreign exchange over a longer period.
The investors need a reliable partner that has full backing by its promoters,
including availability of funds.
Promoters' Needs
The Nordic promoters are ideally looking for a successful, effcient organisation
with a portfolio of good projects with ' developmental' aspects.
Therefore the current option under consideration is summarised as follows:
(a) NORSAD wil be placed with and managed by the NDF. The NORSAD
financial services wil be marketed together with the private sector services
- or the business-to-business services - of NDF, including both equity and
loans. If and when the NORSAD services are no longer in demand by
investors the facilties can be phased out;
(b) Effectively NORSAD is linked with NDF as a special SADC window;
(c) Promotion should be integrated with the promotion al efforts perforrned by
NDF;
(d) NDF could efficiently market NORSAD's services along with its own
facilties aimed at the Nordic and SADC business communities. The
NORSAD facilities could be integrated in the financial package offered;
(e) Working in close co-operation with NDF would allow NORSAD to draw
formally on its capabilities and existing NDF networks;
(f) An offce in the SADC region could be developed as a focal point for all -
national and regional - Nordic/SADC business to business activities.
If and when NORSAD's mandate is extended, one must be aware of possible
budget implications. At present NORSAD operates as a revolving fund. If new
tasks are added beyond extending repayable loans, new expendable resources may
have to be made available for such purposes.
In order to disseminate better and more updated information about business
opportunities a computerised information interchange could be set up, exploiting
the Internet and corresponding commercial networks in a business world which is
increasingly sophisticated in terms of electronic communication. This interchange -
in effect a data bank for business purposes - would contain information relating
to changes in the business environment such as legislation and regulation; major
events such as trade fairs and conferences; foreign exchange data; stbck exchange
information; addresses, phones and faxes of key actors and companies. Electronic
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bulletin boards could be organised for branches of industry or categories of
companies.
Initially , a study could be done to appraise the economic, technical and practical
feasibility of such a project, and to investigate whether similar interchanges exist
elsewhere or are being set up. It is recognised that such a project is ambitious and
would require considerable input in the initialstages. And the continuous inputting
of up-dated information would be critical for its viabilty and usefulness. But the
long-term dividends could be worth it.
An interchange of this nature would surely not obviate the need for direct contact
between companies and parners. Its primar function would be that of a catalyst
stimulating interest to be followed up by the paries concerned.
Another far less ambitious venture of promotion would be to exploit the
experiences of Nordic companies already operating in the region on their own or
in parnership with entrepreneurs from the region. They would be ideally placed
to impar knowledge to others who might be considering mo ving into the region.
What hurdles have they had to overcome? What are the constraints and problems
today? What are the marketing opportunities? These and a host of other questions
could be answered - at least partially for potential traders and investors, without
divulging business secrets.
Small technical groups could be established to address problems of mutual interest.
One area which presents itself is how to establish a workable relationship between
states and their respective business communities based on respect rather than
antagonism. Such groups must comprise representatives of the private and public
sectors alike.
While tourism is not currently envisaged as a priority area for a new framework
of cooperation, it is nevertheless useful as an ilustrative example of how the
SADC SCU and a quasi-private sector body have joined forces to further develop
this important sector. In the context of future Nordic/SADC cooperation these
developments would appear to augur well for developing linkages to the tourism
sector in Nordie countries.
SADC tourism ministers decided to combine private and public sector efforts to
promote the region as a world cIass tourist attraction. The tourism SCU wil join
hands with the privately run Southern African Regional Tourism Council
(SARTOC), whose members include South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland
to set up the Regional Tourism Organisation for Southern Africa (RETOSA).
Private sec tor operators wil play a prominent role in the management of
RETOSA, while Lesotho wil remain the coordinating country for tourism. The
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new institution wil assist member states to formulate tourism policies and
strategies that wil induce growth in this promising area.
A board of 22 directors, made up of an even number of business and government
representatives, wil run RETOSA along commercial lines. It is hoped that
bureaucratic red tape wil be limited and that the institution wil be given enough
flexibilty to keep up with business demands.
Funding for the running of RETOSA wil be sought from governments and the
private sector. Donor agencies wil mainly be asked to support specific projects.
All RETOSA members wil be required to pay the same contribution during the
first years but later on the private sector may be asked to contribute in accordance
with their 1evels of earings. This move towards self-sustainabilty is an important
theme to be developed in the context of any future SADC/Nordic framework. In
this regard linkages to promotion agencies and tour operators in the Nordic
countries could prove an impetus.
It has been proposed that RETOSA be located in a freely accessible business
centre with good communications and that it should commence operations around
April 1996.
Tourism also has a significant spin-off potential in terms of cultural exchange
between the two regions.
6.2.2 Cultural Collaboration
In August 1995 the SADC Council of Ministers adopted a Declaration on
Information and Communication which could form the basis for Nordic
cooperation in these paricular aspects of cultural cooperation. For the purposes of
this report the key sections of the DecIaration are as follows:
AlI member states, in their effort towards Community-building, shalI encourage
the production and distribution of radio and television programmes and press
features about the Community and disseminate productions of the other member
states in their respective countries.
All member states shall through their respective media contribute to the
organisation and promotion of cultural and sports events to alIow greater
interaction, exchange and understanding between the peoples of the Community.
Specific attention needs to be paid to the Nordic/SADC Journalism Centre which
promotes exchanges between media practitioners in the SADC region and the
Nordic countries. The Centre serves as a coordinating factor for Nordie assistance
in the media field in Southern Africa and as a contact point for media relations
between the two regions.
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The Centre has strong links with the Nordic countries. From the very outset, the
Danish School of Journalism was asked by Danida, the sole funding agency, to
serve as implementing agency and thus the main institutional back-up for the
Centre. Through this channel the NSJ Centre is well connected to a network of
journalism training institutions in Europe.
The NSJ Centre has a budget of some US $2 millon to cover the first three years .
of operation. These funds are all provided by Danida on behalf of the N ordic
countries. On top of this, Danida covers the costs of the two Nordie advisors
attached to the Centre. The Commssion for Coordination of Information and
Culture Programes for SADC (CCPIC) under the auspices of the Mozambican
Ministry of Information provides offce space for the Centre in Maputo. The bulk
of the current three-year budget is being spent on courses for an annual intake of
some 100 journalists from the SADC countries. Through six courses per year the
Centre wil run an annual total of 28 course-weeks. With 16- 1 8 students on each
course, the centre wil conduct approximately 480 student-weeks annually.
The cost of establishing and running the NSJ deparment of external projects for
a year is covered by a special grant of US$ 145,000 from Danida. After this initial
year, the Deparment is expected to generate its own income. After a six year
period from the star in 1993 it is envisaged that SADC wil gradually take over
the financing of the NSJ Centre. In the media sector the Media Institute of
Southern Africa, headquarered in Namibia is also a possible beneficiar.
Serious work is currently in progress on regional harmonisation of copyright
legislation, though much work remains to be done. The Nordic countries could
assist in this drive, paricularly when it comes to enforcement machineries to curb
piracy activity. Nordic experience in this field is considerable.
In efforts towards community-building the promotion of regional associations is
critical. This would involve support for independent Southern African culture
institutions, materially and organisationally, vis-à-vis the transnational cultural
industry. Examples might be support for creating a SADC regional chapter of the
African Publishers Network; supporting co-production of feature fims; promoting
regional collaboration between radio and TV networks; setting up a SADC
university press; assisting regional associations in other cultural fields such as
pedorming ars, visual ars, writers, museums and libraries. There is a plethora of
organisations in the Nordic countries capable and probably wiling to enter into
collaborative relationships with counterpars in Southern Africa.
Since past cultural projects under the NSI have been prone to become bilateral
undertakngs, in the future all projects should have a cIear regional dimension in
order to be eligible for support under a new Nordic/SADC framework.
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6.2.3 Political Dialogue
It is to be expected that there is a certain unease within the SADC region about
engaging more deeply in political dialogue with Nordic counterpars regarding
democratisation, human rights, peace and security. Not only is it a new element
in Nordic/SADC relations but there are also sensitivities involved which touch on
national sovereignty.
A certain reticence has been detected about extra-regional involvement,
particularly as far as conflct resolution is concerned. A prevalent view appears to
be that SADC member states ought to be able to handle such problems on their
own. This view not only stems from a sen se of pride but also from an
understanding that ' ownership' of resolutions of disputes is critical to their
workabilty. Those closest to the problems are more likely to appreciate the
sensitivities and hurdles to be overcome in implementing negotiated settlements.
On the other hand, there is a sense of ambivalence. A notion exists that Southern
African states are likely to be so dose to the problems at hand that their analytical
objectivity may suffer. As a corollary, the paries in direct dispute may not
consider a Southern African mediator impartial. As aresult, extra-regional actors
could add impariality. In this respect the Nordic states could arguably have a
comparative advantage. First, they have no colonial past in the region. Second,
they have, on the contrar, been staunch supporters of the anti-colonial struggles
of the Southern African peoples, caried over into post-independence aid
programes. Third, they are not suspected of pursuing great power hidden
agendas. Granted this comparative advantage, it should be noted, nevertheless, that
any involvement by Nordics in conflct mediation should be demand-driven.
Nordic assistance in this regard should be seen as a stand-by facility to be called
upon if and when needed.
Besides responses to conflcts through mediation there would be wide scope for
discussion of democratisation and human rights as part of a political dialogue. As
long established democracies and pioneers in human rights promotion the Nordic
countries would be an interesting discussion parner.
Apart from regional questions of peace and security, the prevailng attitude
towards political dialogue on global issues is far more forthcoming. Suggested
themes include disarmament, UN reform, the environment, peace-keeping, lessons
from regional integration in other parts of the world, and global trade regimes
induding regionalisation of trade in blocs. Beyond dialogue, attempts to evolve,
in a spirit of likemindedness, a common stanee on global issues in international
fora are we1comed. A case in point is UN reform in which the Nordic countries
have been active for some time. A Nordic/SADC voting bloc on such issues in the
UN General Assembly, perhaps with the addition of other likeminded states like
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the Netherlands and Canada, would be noticed. By contrast, the chances of such
likemindedness evolving under the Berlin Declaration are minuscule.
The question of leve1 and range of representation in a dialogue should be treated
as a matter of expediency. In most cases ministerial level would be appropriate,
with civil service support. In other cases, representatives of civil society could take
par. They are not mutually exclusive, but should be considered on a case by case
basis. Certain sensitive issues would not be amenable to civil society paricipation.
But on democratisation and human rights civil society could have a major role to
play. A spin-off of civil society involvement might be popularisation of SADC
throughout the region.
There should be a certain regularity to Nordic/SADC political dialogue. It is
suggested that the Annual Consultative Conferences are suitable for a start. But
other venues and periodicities may be considered as well.
It should be pointed out that political dialogue as a new area of cooperation is
different in nature from those of business and culture. Political dialogue does not
fit into the fixed-term project format with specified outputs. Rather, a political
dialogue is a continuous process through which positions and views mature and
evolve. As such, political dialogue is a long-term undertakng and somewhat
amorphous compared to undertakngs in business and cultural collaboration. As
long as this fact is acknowledged and fully appreciated at the outset it should not
be allowed to cause frustrations over lacking tangible results. On the other hand,
political dialogue does not prec1ude tangible success, e.g. in terms of
breakthroughs in international negotiations or more modestly in conflct resolution.
Similarly, prevention of problems is equally important, even if not creating CNN
headlines.
In order to make political dialogue somewhat more tangible, it should be linked
to training and capacity-building. Courses could be developed in the field of
peace-keeping diplomacy, mediation techniques, human rights instruments and
reporting etc.
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7. Options for a Future Framework
This concIuding chapter wil present a number of options for a new framework of
cooperation between the Nordic and SADC regions. Issues addressed incIude the
scope and range of cooperation as well as the administrative mechanisms of
consultation.
7.1 Points of Departure
The point of deparure as far as both paries are concerned is that Nordic/SADC
cooperation should be continued in one form or another. That is as far as the
consensus extends. There is some disagreement as to the precise form of a new
framework - both in substance and admnistratively.
The Nordics are adamant that the NSI has outlived its usefulness in its present
form. Past performance attests to that. On that understanding the Nordic preference
seems to be a quiet winding down of the NSI.
The SADC side, on the other hand, while acknowledging that meagre results have
been achieved, place greater emphasis on a changing environment which gives
grounds for optimism and a better basis for future cooperation than was the case
in the past decade. SADC would, therefore, like to see the continuation of a
reinvigorated yet amended NSI.
There is a general consensus on the SADC side that there is a need for some form
of ongoing relationship with the Nordic states that is over and above the bilateral
relationships with individual countries. This is based not only on the historical
con text of the past relationship but also on a perception that there is a special
relationship between the two regions which can help SADC build itself into a truly
integrated region. The key to success is to define a niche for this relationship
which complements other initiatives.
Below two sets of options are presented - one dealing with the substantive content
of a new framework in terms of areas of cooperation, and the other addressing
administrative arangements for consultation and implementation of whatever is
agreed upon in substance. The two sets of options are, of course, inter-related, but
are kept separate for the sake of cIarity of presentation.
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7.2 Options: Substanee
With regard to the substance to be covered by a future framework of cooperation
four options present themselves:
(1) Discontinuation of the Nordic/SADC Initiative altogether, while preserving
the NORSAD Fund under a separate agreement;
(2) Discontinuation of the Nordic/SADC Initiative altogether in its present
form and replacing it with political dialogue only, while preserving the
NORSAD Fund under a separate agreement;
(3) Scaling down the current NSI framework to manageable leveis, i.e.
sharpening the focus by reducing the number of areas of cooperation to
three: (a) business cooperation in trade and investment; (b) cultural
collaboration; and (c) political dialogue;
(4) Continuation of the present framework with minor adjustments.
The preferred option by the consultants is the third one, mainly because it
represents areasonable compromise that would serve to preserve the goodwil
between the two regions. This option would accommodate the Nordics' concern
about the unmanageable volume of relations to date, while at the same time satisfy
SADC's wish to continue a relationship which has not been put on the backburner.
The preference for option (3) must be seen in conjunction with the preferred
option on the administrative side.
7.3 Options: Mechanisms
It is essential that there is a streamlined mechanism by which activities under a
new framework of cooperation can be initiated and implemented. Whether it is a
forum for dialogue or an actual project, it is essential that the coordination task is
specific and functional on both sides.
It is essential that the context of the new cooperation vis-a-vis the changes in
SADC and its relationships with the EU and the Nordic countries be fully
understood, to avoid overlap and duplication of effort. To that end the two paries
should deliberate at an early stage on a possible division of labour between the
two region-to-region arangements.
It is important that internal financial commtments be made on the Nordic side in
order to fulfi any obligations that would be implied by a new framework of
cooperation.
It is important that the SADC countries fully appreciate the changing nature of
policies of development aid, and in the Nordic context the fallng away of Finnish
involvement in such a joint approach. In fact, to arive at a better mutual
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understanding in this reg ard, the changing development aid policy environment
could be an early item on the agenda of the envisaged political dialogue.
A key element of a new mechanism for cooperation shouldbe sustainabilty. This
can be achieved if the Nordic parners do not perceive an excessive administrative
burden compared to the output. The SADC side need a c1ear focus on what is to
be achieved, and the resources they can expect to be brought to bear to achieve
success.
The SADC parners must allocate administrative resources to ensure that activities
under a new agreement are c1early defined and implemented with measurable
results. The SADC Secretariat should be fully in volve d in this process, as well as
the SCUs concerned.
Attendant to the substantive options above three options are presented with respect
to mechanisms of consultation and implementation of the new framework.
(1) Ad hoc handling of the new framework by the respective ministries of
foreign affairs with a bare minimum of administration;
(2) A trimmed down administrative arrangement with c1early defined
responsibilities on either side. This would entail the establishment of a
small joint Nordic/SADC management commttee charged with preparing
agendas and documentation for decision-makng by the Nordic/SADC
ministers' meetings in conjunction with the Annual Consultative
Conferences. Such a joint commttee should consist of 2-3 members from
each pary plus one observer from the SADC Secretariat. On the SADC
side the members of the joint commttee could be drawn from the countries
holding responsibilty för the areas of cooperation selected under the new
framework. Also on the SADC side, the Secretariat should serve as the
overall coordinating point; a paricular staff member should be designated
as desk offcer for the Nordic/SADC framework. At the Nordic end a
system of rotating coordinatorship should continue and the 2-3 Nordic
members of the joint management commttee should be drawn from
different countries. This option would altogether do way with the wasteful
and cumbersome joint meetings of senior offcials. The NORSAD Fund
should be allowed to continue operations under a new mandate with more
autonomy along the lines sugge sted in section 6.2.1 above. (Alternatively
to Secretariat representation on the joint management commttee from the
SADC side, the new framework could be treated as a ' sector' within the
SADC structure, whose responsibility could be allocated to a member
state );
(3) Continuation of the present administrative arrangement with minor
adjustments.
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The preferred option by the consultants is the second one because it is deemed
workable in relation to the portfolio of tasks to be performed. Efficacy is its
preoccupation. Its guiding principle is placing responsibilty squarely with already
existing institutions. Spontaneity as an organisational principle is no good. Things
don't get done unless someone is tasked to do them. If something is thought to be
everybody's business in an administrative structure, it tends to become nobody's
business. Option (2) accepts the view that the joint meeting of senior officials is
unsuitable as a decision-makng organ or clearing house, and that, as a corollary,
it can be dispensed with. The suggested joint management commttee would
satisfy demands for minimal administration and enhanced efficiency.
7.4 Commitment
Given the disappointing pedormance of the NSI in the past decade, it is essential
that no new framework of cooperation be adopted without explicit statements of
commtment by both paries to make it work. It would be destructive for future
relations between the two regions if, some years hence, the results would stil be
meagre because of lack of commtment to the objectives of the new framework.
A sec ond blow of disappointment would be most unfortunate and perhaps cause
irreparable damage.
The Nordic side would be expected to take seriously their current policy
discussions about ' new models of development cooperation' and ' development
contracts' and be prepared to persevere in long-term endeavours, even in the face
of disappointments and setbacks. After all a decade is not a long time in the
development perspective of a developing region. To give up at this stage would
be toa easy. Nordie credibilty is at stake.
The SADC side for its part must be prepared to make renewed efforts in the
implementation of the new framework agreed upon, whatever its content. The
centrifugal forces of 12 member states does indeed constitute a challenge of
coordination. But that is what the regional integration project is all about.
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Appendix 1
Terms of Reference
1. Tasks
The consultants wil undertake the following tasks:
(a) sum up:
original objectives of the Nordic/SADC Initiative
past achievements and lessons learned, inc1uding constraints
recent political and economic developments in the SADC region
relevant changes in the development co-operation patterns of the
Nordie countries
the total Nordic/SADC co-operation
(a) identify - based on an analysis of the above - the various options and
instruments for the scope and content of future Nordic/SADC co-operation
within:
overall political dialogue (inc1uding peace and conflct resolution)
support to the private sector (inc1uding the NORSAD Fund as well
as relevant aspects of science and technology)
culture co-operation
(c) recommend a limited number of models for the future framework
2. Methodology
The Senior Officials inter-governmental working gro up has suggested that the
consultants car out their tasks as follows:
sum up existing documentation etc.
elaborate a standard questionnaire to be sent to all member states
undertake visits to selected countries
car out their tasks according to a contract based on this document
and approved by the chairman of the working group
present a report to the working group according to the timetable.
The report should contain their findings as well as a limited number
of options for consideration by the working gro up
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3.
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Work Plan
End September 1995
End September 1995
15 October 1995
1-3 November 1995
Preliminar draft report to be presented toW orking Group .
Working Group meeting (in the SADC
region)
Final draft presente d to the W orking Group
Senior Official' s meeting in Oslo.
Presentation of W orking Group' s final
report.
Appendix 2
Questionnaire on the Future of the NordicJSADC Initiative
Preamble
On 29 Januar 1986 the member states of the then Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the five Nordic countries signed a Joint
Dec1aration on expanded economic and cultural cooperation, referred to as the
Nordic/SADCC Initiative (NSI). A concomitant Framework for a Programe of
Cooperation 1986-90 was agreed to with a view to deepening and broadening the
relations between the two regions. Towards the completion of the first phase of
cooperation a Nordic review was undertaken in 1990 to assess experiences gained
in the initial phase. An agreement for a second phase was signed by the paries in
Januar 1991 to cover the period through 1995. In late 1994 another review was
undertaken with a view to considering the future of this collaborative venture after
ten years of operation by the end of 1995. At the Annual Consultative Conference
in Lilongwe the Nordie and SADC ministers on 1 February 1995 agreed to
establish a joint working group of senior offcials to review and elaborate the
future framework for cooperation between the two regions.
This questionnaire forms one element in an effort by consultants commssioned
by the above-mentioned working group to solicit views from SADC member states
with regard to the future direction of the Initiative - its scope and substance as
well as its administrative mechanisms. The intention is to coalesce divergent
positions into a common stand with respect to future activities under the NSI
umbrella.
Against the backdrop of mixed experiences since 1986 the working group is
determned to scale the Initiative down to manageable size. Hence it wil be
necessary to make a strict order of priorities. It should also be borne in mind that
the region has in the past 3-5 years undergone substantial changes which raise new
and reinforce old concerns of economic and political liberalisation as well as
security matters.
The priorities arrived at should fall within the three following areas of
cooperation:
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· overall political dialogue (including peace and conflct resolution);
· support to the private sector(inc1uding the NORSAD Fund as well as relevant
aspects of science and technology);
· cultural cooperation.
In offering responses to the questions below SADC member states should look to
the future rather than dwell on the past. Since the NSI is a region-to-region
co operative venture it must also be stressed that activities proposed should have
a regional character.
All questions are open-ended for purposes of flexibility in order to allow
respondents to formulate responses suited to their specific circumstances. In the
same vein questions have been formulated rather broadly. However, the answers
should preferably be as specific and operational as possible to give guidance for
future action. Respondents are also encouraged to give forthright replies, all of
which wil be treated confidentially. Responses should be recorded on separate
sheets of paper as the need for variable space is likely to arise.
Question 1: What is your understanding of the role of the Nordic!SADC
Initiative in terms of development cooperation?
Question 2: In your assessment what have been the achievements and
disappointments to date of the Nordic!SADC Initiative?
Question 3: In what way have activities under the Nordic!SADC Initiative
benefited your country?
Question 4: To what extent have activities carried out under the
Nordic!SADC Initiative been of a genuine regional nature (i.e.
involving at least two countries or more) as distinct from
bilateral?
Question 5: What do you believe have been the established priorities of the
Nordic!SADC Initiative?
Question 6: Have the activities you are aware of under the Nordic!SADC
Initiative been undertaken according to the established
priorities (cf. preceding question) or have they been undertaken
in a haphazard manner? Please give examples, if possible.
Question 7: Jf activities have not, in your view, been undertaken according
to established priorities, why do you think that has been so?
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Question 8: Have the administrative arrangements (especially the Joiot
Meeting of Senior Offciais) of the Nordic!SADC Initiative been
satisfactory?
Question 9: Have consultations and communication prior to the Joiot
Meetings of Senior Offcials been adequate within the region?
Question 10: Do you have any specifc suggestions as to how the
administrative mechanisms may be improved to enhance
effciency and ease of communication?
Question 1 1: In view of recent changes in Southern Africa how can the
Nordic!SADC Initiative be used constructively to address new
issues of peace and security?
Question 12: How can the Nordic!SADC Initiative help faciltate the
development of the private sector in Southern Africa?
Question 13: How can the Nordic!SADC Initiative be used as a vehicle for
cultural cooperation between the two regions?
Question 14: Are there any other important priority areas, in your view,
which should be considered? Jf so, please state which ones as
specifcally as possible?
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